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INTRODUCTION

Since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1947,' multilateral trade negotiations have primarily focused
* Jonathan S. Gowdy, Associate, Morrison & Foerster, Washington, D.C. Duke
University, B.A., 1993; University of Florida, J.D., 1996. This Note is dedicated to my parents,
David and Valerie, for always giving me support and instilling in me a committment to
excellence, and to Jennifer Manning, for her love and friendship.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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on the elimination of import tariffs and government nontariff trade
barriers.2 When the Uruguay Round negotiations were completed in
December 1993, many government obstacles to free trade were further
reduced or eliminated, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) was
established to resolve disputes regarding alleged violations of GATT
agreements.' GATT, however, failed to establish international standards
for the regulation of private competitive behavior Despite the liberalization of government-imposed trade restrictions, some commentators
have argued that governmental restraints are being replaced by private
conduct that has the same trade-restricting effect.6 Because of this
perception, policymakers have begun to search for a remedy that
prevents private trade barriers from restricting competition and the free
flow of goods and services across borders.7
The United States traditionally has pursued two methods to combat
private restraints on international trade that takes place outside the
United States. First, the United States has negotiated bilateral agreements in an attempt to foster greater cooperation between national or
regional competition enforcement agencies These agreements are
2. Aubry D. Smith, Bringing Down Private Trade Barriers-AnAssessment of the United
States' UnilateralOptions: Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and ExtraterritorialApplication
of U.S. Antitrust Law, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 241, 242 n.1 (1994).
3. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, GATT Doc.
No. MTN/FA, 33 I.L.M. 1, 13 (1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round].
4. Id. at 130; Smith, supra note 2, at 241.
5. Although GATT failed to adopt an international antitrust code, there have been several
multilateral initiatives to adopt worldwide competition policy standards. See, e.g., Draft
International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO Plurilateral Trade Agreement, July 10, 1993, 64
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, Aug. 19, 1993, at S-3 [hereinafter Draft
International Antitrust Code] (proposing a plurilateral antitrust agreement, drafted by an
international panel of experts, known as the International Antitrust Code Working Group, that
has not been adopted under GATT). GATT does regulate one aspect of anti-competitive private
pricing behavior, called "dumping," the sale of products at less than fair value to capture market
share and force competitors out of the target market. Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of GATT, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 1186 U.N.T.S. 2.
6. See, e.g., James F. Rill, Competition Policy: A Forcefor Open Markets, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 637 (1993).
7. Smith, supra note 2, at 242.
8. Nina Hachigian, Essential Mutual Assistance in InternationalAntitrust Enforcement,
29 INT'L LAW. 117, 138 (1995); Smith, supra note 2, at 243; Diane P. Wood, The Impossible
Dream: Real InternationalAntitrust, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, pt. II.B.3. See, e.g., Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European
Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, U.S.-European Communities, Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1491 (1991) [hereinafter EC-U.S. Agreement]; Canada-United
States Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with
Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., 23 I.L.M. 275;
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designed to help the agencies share information, conduct joint investigations, and encourage one another to enforce their own competition
laws.9 Second, the U.S. government and private parties have sought
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. 0 The current U.S.
policy is to apply U.S. antitrust laws, not only to conduct abroad that
affects the U.S. domestic market, but also to exclusionary conduct
abroad that impedes access of U.S. companies to foreign markets."
While the attempts to combat private trade barriers through increased
cooperation and antitrust enforcement have achieved moderate success,
they suffer from certain limitations. For example, although the
bilateral agreements between national enforcement agencies have
increased the flow of information, none of them require the disclosure,
or extraterritorial collection, of confidential information by national
antitrust enforcement agencies. 3 And yet it is precisely this confidential information, for example, internal documents, information received
from companies by government agencies, and investigatory findings, that
often is critical to antitrust enforcement and prosecution. 4 Besides the
difficulty of obtaining adequate discovery, jurisdictional and international comity considerations also have hampered attempts to apply U.S.
Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl., 34 U.S.T.
388; Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June
23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956. The United States also has pursued multilateral
initiatives through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and
the United Nations to improve cooperation between enforcement agencies. Hachigian, supra, at
136-37; see, e.g., ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995),

68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1707, Apr. 6, 1995, at S-1 [hereinafter ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES].

9. Hachigian, supra note 8, at 118, 138-40; Smith, supra note 2, at 243. For example,
the first article of the EC-U.S. Agreement sets out its purpose, "to promote cooperation and
coordination and lessen the possibility of impact of differences between the parties in the
application of their competition laws." EC-U.S. Agreement, supra note 8, at 1492. Each party
to the EC-U.S. Agreement agrees to release information regarding anti-competitive conduct
within its jurisdiction to any other party, upon specific request, provided that releasing the
information does not violate any existing domestic confidentiality laws. Id. at 1496.
10. Smith, supra note 2, at 243; Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §
6a (1982); ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at S-3; see, e.g., Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pub. L. No. 82-117, Justice Department Will Challenge Foreign
Restraints on U.S. Exports under Antitrust Laws 1 (1992); see United States v. Pilkington PLC,
Civil No. 94-345 (D. Ariz. filed June 25, 1994); Lori B. Morgan & Helaine S. Rosenbaum, U.S.
Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Policy, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 192, 192 (1993).
12. See Hachigian, supra note 8, at 118; see also Smith, supra note 2, at 246-48.
13. Hachigian, supra note 8, at 118.
14. Id.
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antitrust law extraterritorially. 5 Furthermore, attempted enforcements
against foreign nationals have triggered the enactment of statutes by
other nations to block U.S. discovery and to reduce or eliminate the
treble damages portion of U.S. judgments. 6
II. SECTION 301: A NEW APPROACH
In light of the difficulties surrounding cooperation agreements and
the application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign conduct, Congress created
a third method for combatting anticompetitive practices that occur
outside the United States, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988."7 In the 1988 Act, Congress amended section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974.18 Section 301, as amended, empowers the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to enforce any rights of the United States
that are denied by, and to obtain the elimination of, any act, policy, or
practice of a foreign government that (1) violates, or is inconsistent
with, or otherwise denies benefits to the United States under existing
trade agreements, or (2) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory
and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce. 9 The 1988 Act added to the
statute's definition of "unreasonable" practices "the toleration by a
foreign government of systematic anticompetitive activities by enterprises or among enterprises in the foreign country that have the effect of
restricting, on a basis that is inconsistent with commercial considerations, access of United States goods or services to a foreign market."2
This amendment was designed to influence foreign governments to
increase their regulation of anticompetitive activity within their
jurisdictions, and ultimately, to discourage private parties within those
jurisdictions from engaging in unfair trade practices that prevent

15. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2910; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, 549 F.2d 597, 605-15 (9th Cir. 1976); Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 443-44;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402, 403
(1986); Smith, supra note 2, at 246-48. For an excellent discussion of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law, see John A. Trenor, Jurisdiction and the Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws After Hartford Fire, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (1995).
16. See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the
Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1 (1995). Examples of blocking

statutes include the following: Australian Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act,
AUSTL. AcTs P. 3 (1984); Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. ch. F-29
(1985) (Can.); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
17. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)).
18. Id. at 1164 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)).
19. Id. (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)-(b) (1994)).
20. Id. at 1167 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (1994)).
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American companies from competing abroad.2 ' Section 301 authorizes
any "interested party" to file a petition with USTR to initiate an
investigation, and it allows USTR itself to initiate investigations.22 If
USTR determines after investigation, that a foreign government is
tolerating anticompetitive activities, section 301 authorizes USTR to
negotiate an agreement with the foreign country to cease its toleration
of the "unreasonable" practice or, if no agreement can be reached, to
take retaliatory action, such as imposing trade sanctions against the
country.
On May 18, 1995, Eastman Kodak Company was the first private
party to directly petition USTR under this clause, commonly referred to
as the "toleration of anticompetitive practice clause."'24 Kodak's petition
alleged that the Japanese government had permitted Kodak's chief rival
in the Japanese market, Fuji, to engage in systematic anticompetitive
practices that violated Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and
prevented Kodak from selling its products in Japan.' Specifically,
Kodak claimed that Fuji excluded Kodak from the consumer photographic film and paper markets in Japan through the use of exclusive
dealing contracts, rebate programs, and resale price maintenance
schemes with wholesale distributors and retailers.26
While Kodak was not the first American company to complain about
Japanese toleration of anticompetitive practices,27 it was the first party
to petition for relief under section 301's "toleration of anticompetitive
practice clause. ' 28 The purpose of this Note is to examine why Kodak
chose section 301 as the forum for its complaint instead of pursuing
other available remedies. 29 The Note demonstrates that Kodak's

21. Smith, supra note 2, at 268-69; HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM ACT OF 1987, H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 68-69 (1987) [hereinafter HOUSE COMM. REP. No. 40].
22. 102 Stat. 1168-69 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994)).
23. Id. at 1165-66 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (1994)).
24. Wendy Bounds & Bob Davis, Kodak Charges Japan, Fuji Block Access, WALL ST.
J., May 19, 1995, at A2. The author of this Note was involved in the research and preparation
of Rewriting History and the Fuji Brief, which were submitted to the USTR by the law firm of
Willkie, Farr & Gallagher on behalf of Fuji.
25. Memorandum in Support of a Petition Filed Pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, As Amended, Titled Privatizing Protection: Japanese Market Barriers in Consumer
Photographic Film and Consumer Photographic Paper, May 1995, at 19 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Privatizing Protection].
26. Id. at 149-248.
27. Eduaurdo Lechica & Michael W. Miller, U.S. Semiconductor Makers Want Reagan
to Prod Japan to Open Its Market More, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1985, at 29.
28. See supra note 24.
29. Instead of filing its § 301 petition, Kodak could have initiated a private suit in federal
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decision was based on a strategic desire to take advantage of the
procedural and substantive defects contained in section 301.30
Furthermore, because Kodak was the first party to petition USTR
under this provision, USTR's treatment of Kodak's petition will have an
enormous precedential effect that will guide the treatment of future
petitions.3' If USTR fails to adequately scrutinize Kodak's allegations
and takes retaliatory action, the U.S. companies involved in a battle for
market share in a foreign country will have an incentive to file their
own section 301 complaint in the hopes that the U.S. government will
rush to their side to improve their competitive position.32
In order to avoid this outcome, this Note recommends that USTR
integrate into its current procedures for implementing section 301
additional procedural and substantive safeguards against unsubstantiated
and premature allegations by U.S. companies against their foreign
competitors.33 In addition, this Note examines how any use of section
301's "toleration of anticompetitive practice clause" damages U.S.
international trade relations 34 and provides alternative solutions to the
problem of foreign private trade barriers.35
III. PROCEDURAL DEFECTS OF SECTION 301

A. USTR's Lack of Resources and Expertise
Under section 301's "toleration of anticompetitive practice clause,"
USTR decides whether to initiate an investigation.36 Once USTR
decides to initiate an investigation, the statute also grants USTR the task
of determining, in fact, whether the foreign government is tolerating

court seeking relief under the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. See supra note 10
and accompanying text. In addition, Kodak could have petitioned the Japan Fair Trade
Commission (JFTC), the government agency in charge of enforcing Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law
(AML), to investigate Fuji's practices and sanction Fuji for any violations of the AML. See infra
text accompanying notes 63-65.
30. See infra pts. III, IV.
31. See Comments of Fujifilm Regarding Legal Issues at 9, USTR Investigation Pursuant
to Section 302 Concerning Barriers to Access to the Japanese Market for Consumer Photographic Film and Paper at 9 (Aug. 9, 1995) (USTR) (No. 301-99) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Fuji Brief].
32. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 6; Letter from William H. Barringer, Counsel to Fuji
Photo Film Co., Ltd., to Irving Williamson, Chairman, Section 301 Committee, Office of the
USTR 5 (June 27, 1995) (USTR) (No. 301-99) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fuji Letter].
33. See infra pts. III, IV & VI.
34. See infra pt. V.
35. See infra pt. VI.
36. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (1994).
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anticompetitive practices.37 In order for USTR to conclude that a
foreign country is tolerating anticompetitive practices, USTR must first
find that anticompetitive practices are actually taking place. As any
antitrust lawyer knows, "the investigation of anticompetitive practices
is highly complex and fact-specific."38 Antitrust investigations involve
"lengthy and complex discovery, extended trials, nuanced factual
analysis, and difficult legal judgments."39
In light of the enormous complexity of issues that are encountered
in investigations of anticompetitive activity, Congress should have
delegated the authority to resolve them to an agency with the appropriate investigatory and prosecutorial resources. Instead, Congress
delegated this authority to USTR. Since its inception, USTR has been
ill-equipped to investigate highly complex factual issues.4 USTR was
primarily created to be the chief representative of the United States in
all international trade negotiations.4 ' In addition, the agency was
established to formulate international trade policy and to advise the
President and Congress regarding the negotiation and administration of
international trade agreements." Since USTR, as an institution, is
unfamiliar with the nuances of anticompetitive practice investigations,
it does not have the expertise that is necessary to adequately carry out
such an investigation under section 301. Moreover, even if USTR was
capable of conducting the investigation, the international community
would not accept USTR as a neutral, unbiased factfinder because it
perceives the agency as merely a political advocate for the trading
interests of American companies.43
Even if USTR had the requisite expertise and was perceived to be
above political influence, section 301 does not provide USTR with the
tools of discovery or the time to gather and objectively analyze the

37. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(d)(1)(A) (1994).
38. Fuji Letter, supra note 32, at 4; see also In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp.
1138, 1155 (N.D. II. 1979) (quoting Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S.
Antitrust Litigation:Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse
for Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747 (1974) ("the heart of any American antitrust case
is the discovery of business documents.").
39. Fuji Letter, supra note 32, at 4.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c) (1982); Patricia I. Hansen, Defining Unreasonableness in
International Trade: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 86 YALE L.J. 1122, 1128 n.33
(1987); Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 4; Fuji Letter, supra note 32, at 4.
41. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(C) (1982); see Hansen, supra note 40, at 1128 n.33; see also
Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 4.
42. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(A), (F), (G), (H) (1982); Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 4.
43. Position Paper of Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. and Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. at 6
(Nov. 15, 1995) (USTR) (No. 301-99) (on file with author) [hereinafter Downey Chandler
Paper].
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factual information normally involved in such complex litigation. 44 For
example, in investigations concerning "unreasonable" anticompetitive
practices, when no trade agreement is involved, USTR must make its
determination within one year of initiating the investigation.45 On the
other hand, antitrust litigation in U.S. federal courts and investigations
of anticompetitive activity at the Department of Justice (DOJ) or Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) typically take several years to resolve.46
In addition, while the statute allows interested parties to present their
views through written submissions or a public hearing,47 it does not
give USTR the power to compel disclosure of company documents or
to demand answers to written interrogatories that might contain the
information necessary to make an informed decision. Even though
private antitrust plaintiffs and U.S. enforcement agencies occasionally
have encountered problems in obtaining adequate discovery from foreign
defendants,48 the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure49 and the broad investigative powers granted to the
DOJ and the FTC provide a superior process for obtaining pertinent
information. Finally, even if USTR had the requisite expertise and the
ability to obtain information, it would have to evaluate the facts with a
relatively small staff5 and without any substantive standards to
apply. 2 As a result, USTR is ill-equipped to make a fair and reason-

44. When no trade agreement is involved, the statute requires USTR to make a
determination concerning an "unreasonable" practice on or before the date that is 12 months
after the date on which the investigation is initiated. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2)(B) (1994). In
contrast, nearly 75% of all private antitrust suits that result in a judgment take more than one
year to complete. Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, Symposium: An Inquiry into the
Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and Independently Initiated Cases
Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163, 1208-09 (1986).
45. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2)(B) (1994).
46. See supra note 44; Bryan Gruley, FTC Heeding Companies Complaints, Moves to
Speed Its Challenges to Mergers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1996, at A3.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(b)(1)(A) (1994).
48. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. I11.1979).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (1994).
50. For example, the Antitrust Civil Process Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314), provides the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ with compulsory pre-complaint civil investigative process powers.
Under the Act, the Division can require any person with information relevant to an investigation
to produce documents, answer interrogatories, or give oral testimony. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1.
51. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 4; Fuji Letter, supra note 32, at 5. The USTR has 153
employees. Telephone Interview with USTR (Dec. 6, 1996). On the other hand, the Antitrust
Division at the Department of Justice has 777 employees-331 attorneys, 50 economists, 163
paralegals, 132 secretaries, and 101 other employees. Telephone Interview with Antitrust
Division Personnel Office (Dec. 6, 1996).
52. See infra pt. IV.A.; see also Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 5; Fuji Letter, supra note 32,
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able inquiry into, and determination of, whether anticompetitive
practices are taking place in a foreign market.
B. No Requirementfor Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Section 301 authorizes USTR to initiate investigations and to take
retaliatory action against certain governmental "act[s], polic[ies], or
practice[s]. 53 Consequently, a petition claiming that a foreign country
has "tolerated" anticompetitive activity must demonstrate more than the
existence of anticompetitive behavior by a private party within that
country. The petition must allege that the foreign government had
knowledge of such behavior but refused to take appropriate action to
prohibit or restrict such behavior.5"
Despite section 301's requirement that the foreign government have
knowledge of the anticompetitive behavior,55 the statute itself does not
demand that a private petitioner give the foreign government notice of
its allegations before bringing a complaint to USTR. However, the
legislative history suggests that when USTR is determining whether a
foreign government has "tolerated" anticompetitive activity, Congress
intended that USTR consider whether and how the foreign government
was notified of the allegations. 6 In order to adhere to this congressional mandate, USTR, under its rulemaking power, could impose a
notification requirement on private parties and refuse to accept petitions
that fail to satisfy this condition.57 In keeping with section 301's focus
on government toleration, the most effective notification requirement
would insist that private petitioners avail themselves of local remedies
before pursuing their claim with USTR under section 301."8
53. 19 U.S.C. §§ 241 1(a)-(b), 2412(a)-(c) (1994).
54. URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING
BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R.
Doe. No. 103-316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 367 (1994) [hereinafter SAA].
55. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (1994).
56. See SAA, supra note 54, at 367.
57. 19 U.S.C. § 2419(l) (1994).
58. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at4-9 (citing Bronckers, Marco C.E.J., PrivateResponse
to Foreign Unfdir Trade Practices-UnitedStates and EEC Complaint Procedures, 6 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & BUs. 651, 658 (1984) (indicating that an exhaustion of local remedies would be
required when a foreign government is failing to apply its own law) (also citing S. REP. No.
308, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1983), in which the Senate Finance Committee insists, in
connection with § 301 complaints, that a key factor in USTR's determination of whether to
initiate an investigation should be "a consideration of the appropriate legal action available to,
or taken by, the aggrieved United States party to defend its rights in the subject country"); A
Report by Fujifilm, titled Rewriting History: Kodak's Revisionist Account of the Japanese
Consumer Photographic Market, at 215-18 (July 31, 1995) (USTR) (No. 301-99) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Rewriting History].
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The legal concept of "exhaustion" is widely recognized in international and U.S. law. 9 The exhaustion requirement is also particularly
relevant to a section 301 case under the anticompetitive practice
provision for several reasons. First, "it ensures that complex facts are
adequately investigated and compiled,"' and, second, "it ensures that
agencies [with] ... expertise have the opportunity to apply that
expertise."'" Finally, by demanding that petitioners avail themselves of
local remedies, USTR would simplify its investigation.6'
For example, as Fuji pointed out in its response to Kodak's petition,
Kodak easily could have pursued its allegations against Fuji in Japan by
bringing its complaint to the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), the
63
agency responsible for enforcing Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML).
When any person brings a suspected violation of the AML to the
JFTC's attention, Japanese law requires that the JFTC investigate the

59. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 7-8 (citing Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United
States), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27 (holding that the exhaustion of local remedies requirement is a "well
established rule of customary international law.... [I]t has been considered necessary that the
State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means,
within the framework of its own domestic legal system")); id. at 8 (" 'Under international law,
ordinarily a state is not required to consider a claim by another state for an injury to its national
until that person has exhausted domestic remedies, unless such remedies are clearly sham or
inadequate, or their application is unreasonably prolonged.' "); id. (citing Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 523-31 (1976) ("requiring exhaustion of state or local remedies prior
to appeal on constitutional basis from action by city zoning board") (also citing Budd Co. Wheel
& Brake Div. v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 1549, 1554-56 (1991) ("requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies in appeal from final determination by the United States Department of
Commerce")); id. at 9 ("Under international law, exhaustion of local remedies is excused if
resort to local remedies would be futile. However, this exception applies in very limited
circumstances, for example, when there exists no provision of law permitting redress of the
claims or when the remedial process available is corrupt and inefficient and has already denied
justice in the 'broadest sense' ") (citing Claim of Finnish Shipowners (Finland v. Great Britain),
3 U.S. Rep. Int'l Arbitral Awards 1479, 1495, 1504); id. (citing case concerning Elettronica
Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. at 47) ("declining to require exhaustion
because no provision for redress existed absent precedent for the proposition that provisions of
the U.S.-Italy FCN Treaty were 'self-executing' ").
60. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 8 (" '[Rieview may be seriously hampered if the
appropriate agency has no chance to ... make a factual record reflecting all aspects of the
problem.' ") (citing Moore, 431 U.S. at 523-3 1).
61. See id. ("Since agency decisions ... frequently require expertise, the agency should
be given the first opportunity ... to apply that expertise.") (quoting McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969)).
62. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 6; Fuji Letter, supra note 32, at 4.
63. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 5; Fuji Letter, supra note 32, at 5; Rewriting History,
supra note 58, at 131. For a more detailed analysis of Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law, see H. IYORI
& UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACTS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN (3d ed. 1994); H. First, Antitrust
Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 137 (1995).
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claim.' In addition, the JFTC must provide to any person reporting
such a violation a written report explaining whether or not it will take
action against the alleged violator."
If Kodak had brought a complaint to the FTC, and the JFTC failed
to investigate, then USTR would have direct evidence indicating that
Japan was "tolerating" anticompetitive activity." If the agency did
investigate, it is likely that the JFTC, an agency with expertise in
applying the standards of Japan's AML and equipped to conduct
complex factual investigations, would have narrowed the scope of the
issues and facts in dispute.67 In addition, if the JFrC agreed with
Kodak's allegations and took remedial action satisfactory to Kodak, then
any section 301 petition would not be necessary. 8
Besides making USTR's job more manageable, the exhaustion of
local remedies requirement has other beneficial policy implications. By
failing to maintain this requirement, USTR would allow U.S. companies
involved in commercial disputes overseas to subvert the intended use of
section 301.69 Congress intended section 301 to influence foreign
governments to increase their antitrust regulation by providing a
retaliatory mechanism when the foreign country's enforcement is
inadequate.7" It did not intend for USTR to serve as a substitute for the
foreign country's enforcement agency.7 ' Furthermore, by accepting
petitions before an exhaustion of available remedies, USTR would
embroil itself in the unsuited role of an "amateur antitrust agency"72
and possibly damage any long range goals of the United States in
establishing international standards of competition policy.73 However,
in light of USTR's initiation of an investigation in response to Kodak's
petition,74 it appears that, in practice, exhaustion of local remedies is

64. Rewriting History, supra note 58, at 131; Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 5.
65. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 5-6; Rewriting History, supra note 58, at 131.
66. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 6; Fuji Letter, supra note 32, at 5.
67. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 6; Fuji Letter, supra note 32, at 5-6.
68. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 6; Fuji Letter, supra note 32, at 5-6.
69. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 6; HOUSE COMM. REP. No. 40, supra note 21, at 6869; Hansen, supra note 40, at 1128-29.
70. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 5; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
71. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 5; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
569-70 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1602-03 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576].
72. Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 5.
73. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 7. United States President Bill Clinton told reporters
at a press conference in Brussels after talks with the European Commission that discussions had
included the "new generation" of trade issues such as competition standards. The President's
News Conference with European Union Leaders in Brussels, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 33
(Jan. 11, 1994).
74. USTR accepted Kodak's petition and initiated an investigation on July 3, 1995. Steven
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not a necessary prerequisite for a private party petition under section
301's "toleration of anticompetitive practices clause."
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DEFECTS OF SECTION 301

A. Section 301 Fails to Provide Adequate
Standardsfor Determining Whether Trade
PracticesAre Anticompetitive
Although section 301 identifies the toleration of anticompetitive
practices by a foreign country as an unreasonable practice that authorizes USTR to take retaliatory action,7" the statute fails to provide
adequate substantive criteria for determining whether activities are
anticompetitive.76 Instead of referring to the antitrust rules of the
United States or to the rules of the country in which the offending
activities take place, the statute appears to set its own standard, referring
to activities that are restrictive "on a basis that is inconsistent with
commercial considerations."77 "This standard, however, only tells us
the obvious, namely that restrictive business practices should not be
considered anticompetitive when foreign companies are refusing to buy
United States products due to high prices or inferior quality. 78
Despite the lack of a standard in the text of the statute, the legislative
history offers USTR some general guidance in making its determination. 79 The principal House Report that accompanied the 1988 Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act indicates that USTR must consider
several factors in determining whether the toleration is actionable."
First, the provision does not apply to all purchasing decisions by private
firms. 1 Rather, it only applies to a narrow range of pervasive or
Pearlstein, U.S. Launches New Fight With Japanon Trade: Government to Probe Complaint by
Kodak of Closed Film Market, WASH. POST, July 4, 1995, at El.

75. 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (1994).
76. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 5.
77. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (1994).
78. Smith, supra note 2, at 277.
79. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 71, at 569-70, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1602-03; H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 21, at 69.
80. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 21, at 69.
81. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 71, at 570, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1603
("The inclusion of certain anticompetitive private activities as an actionable [S]ection 301 act,
policy, or practice is not intended to apply broadly to any and all purchasing decisions by private
firms.... [Rather the provision applies only] to pervasive or egregious activities in a foreign
country by or among private firms which result in a persistent pattern of restricted market access
by U.S. firms in a particular industry."); H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 21, at 69 (noting that this
type of behavior includes, but is not limited to, "toleration of cartels or cartel-type behavior by
or among private firms; failure to enforce antitrust laws; or toleration of closed purchasing

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss3/3

12

Gowdy: Exposing Kodak: A Critique of the Toleration of Anticompetitive P
ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 301

egregious activities. 2 Second, USTR should take into account "whether
the anticompetitive foreign private activities are inconsistent with local
of the activities; and the degree
(not United States) law; the flagrancy
83
of the effect on U.S. commerce.,
The Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) accompanying the
most recent amendments to section 301 supplied some additional
guidance for USTR in interpreting the provision." Specifically, the
SAA requires petitioners to provide evidence that the foreign government allegedly tolerating the anticompetitive practices had available to
it "the identity of the relevant markets affected, a description of the
specific practices, and an indication of their duration and pervasiveness."85 Finally, in considering all of these factors, Congress did not
intend for the provision to regulate the business practices of foreign
firms or to enforce upon foreign governments United States concepts of
antitrust law. 6
Despite the legislative history's explicit statement that the provision
is not meant to impose U.S. antitrust standards on foreign governments, 7 the statute also requires that USTR take into account "reciprocal opportunities in the United States for foreign nationals" when
determining whether an act is "unreasonable." 8 When this apparent

behavior on the part of private firm that precludes or limits United States access in a concerted
and systematic way").
82. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, supra note 71, at 570, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1603.
83. Id. The Conference Report also specifically states that the provision was designed to
allow USTR "to attack trade-restrictive activities by foreign private interests only when the
foreign government is in essence at least a silent partner to the restrictive practice." Id.
84. See SAA, supra note 54, at 367. The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act amended
the definition of "unreasonable" with respect to anticompetitive practices to ensure that the
provision applied to: "(1) state-owned enterprises as well as private firms; (2) denial of fair and
equitable market access opportunities for U.S. services as well as goods; and (3) anticompetitive
practices that restrict the sale of U.S. goods or services to a foreign market, not just to foreign
firms that engage in such practices." H.R. REP. No. 826, pt. I, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3908.
85. See SAA, supra note 54, at 367.
86. Id. (directing USTR to "take into account whether the anticompetitive activities are
inconsistent with the foreign country's own laws.. . ." (emphasis added)). On the other hand,
the House Report also mentioned the need to consider the degree to which opportunities for U.S.
firms in the foreign country are "reciprocal" to those available to firms from the foreign country
in the United States. H.R. REP. No. 40, supra note 21, at 69.
87. See SAA, supra note 54, at 367.
88. 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(d)(3)(D) (1994). In fact, Fuji's initial response to Kodak's petition
contained almost 40 pages detailing Kodak's behavior in the United States. Rewriting History,
supra note 58, at 221-59. Fuji claimed that Kodak was engaged in practices that were more
exclusionary than Fuji's practices in Japan. Id. at 223.
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contradiction is combined with the fact that the statute and the legislative history contain only general guidelines, it is clear that section 301
does not provide a standard that can be applied as rules. 9 Rather, the
guidelines appear to be based on judgments about the disparity between,
or comparability of, market outcomes.9" The standard is one that
attempts to gauge the degree of reciprocity between competitive
conditions in a foreign country and those in the United States. 9'
Because the standard for determining whether practices are
anticompetitive is based on reciprocal conditions in the U.S. market,
USTR should, at a minimum, require petitioners to demonstrate that the
alleged practices would be illegal under U.S. law and are not currently
taking place in the United States.92 Surely Congress did not intend to
impose upon foreign governments a higher level of protection for U.S.
firms from anticompetitive behavior in the foreign governments' home
markets than the U.S. government extends to foreign firms in the U.S.
home market.93 However, assuming that a petitioner can demonstrate
that the tolerated practices would violate U.S. law if the conduct took
place in the United States, USTR also should demand that the petitioner
prove that the practices violate the competition laws of the country in
which they take place.94
B. Section 301 PermitsAllegations of
Anticompetitive Practices Which
Suffer from FundamentalDefects
By requiring the petitioner to prove that the alleged practices violate
both U.S. law and the law of the foreign country, USTR can prevent
frivolous petitions from being filed. Without such a requirement, section
301's lack of substantive standards would allow petitioners to allege that
anticompetitive practices are taking place without requiring a high level
of evidentiary proof. An examination of the claims in Kodak's petition
to USTR clearly demonstrates how a lack of clear substantive standards
can permit a petitioner to make allegations that suffer from fundamental
defects in legal analysis.

89. Smith, supra note 2, at 278.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Fuji has argued that USTR and Kodak must prove that similar practices are not
currently being "tolerated" in the United States. Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 24-25.
93. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(D) (1994) (directing USTR to consider "reciprocal
opportunities in the United States for foreign nationals and firms").
94. See SAA, supra note 54, at 367.
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"Kodak's charges of anticompetitive activities can be divided into
two broad categories."95 First, Kodak alleged that its access to film and
photofinishing customers was blocked by a variety of exclusionary
practices 96 (i.e., (1) exclusive dealing contracts between Fuji and
wholesale distributors of film, (2) rebate programs with distributors and
retailers of film, and (3) vertical integration with photofinishing labs).9"
Second, Kodak alleged that Fuji conspired with distributors and retailers
to fix prices in Japan through illegal resale price maintenance
schemes." Kodak's allegations suffered from two fundamental defects.
As to the alleged exclusionary practices, Kodak had previously taken
positions in the U.S. courts that were inconsistent with its allegations
that Fuji's business practices were anticompetitive.99 As to the price
fixing claims, Fuji's alleged practices would have actually boosted
Kodak's sales in Japan."°
1. Exclusionary Practices
The various exclusionary practices alleged in Kodak's petition were
all vertical non-price restraints.' United States antitrust law recognizes that when manufacturers impose vertical non-price restraints on their
distributors, consumers may actually benefit from the restrictions. 2

95. Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 13.
96. Privatizing Protection, supra note 25, at 33-42.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 42-52.
99. See United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1995), aff'g 853
F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); see Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 13; Rewriting History, supra
note 58, at 269-74.
100. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 13; see also Rewriting History, supra note 58, at 96104.
101. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 13 n.24 ("U.S. antitrust law recognizes two broad
categories of relationships among firms: vertical and horizontal. Vertical refers to relationships
among firms at different levels in the chain of product manufacturing and distribution; horizontal
refers to relationships among firms at the same level in the chain. ...In this regard, under U.S.
law[,] alleged agreements between firms at different levels of distribution are considered vertical
regardless of their horizontal effects."). A price restraint is a regulation of the price at which a
product may be sold. Non-price restraints usually restrict sellers from serving particular
territories or customers. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFREY L. HARNSON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

149 (2d ed. 1994) (citing Business Elecs. Corp.

v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 n.4 (1988)); see A-Abart Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 956 F.2d 1399, 1403 (7th Cir.) (categorizing vertical restraint as a conspiracy between
"two firms at different levels in the distribution spectrum"), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 194 (1992).
102. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 13-14 (citing Franklin M. Fisher, Can Exclusive
FranchisesBe Bad?, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: COLLECTED
PAPERS OF FRANKLIN M. FISHER 154 (John Monz ed., 1991) (arguing that an exclusive franchise

may produce efficient gains)); F. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST
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The recognition of these beneficial effects is based on the idea that
consumer welfare is primarily advanced by interbrand competition. 3
Therefore, the suppression of some intrabrand competition will be
permitted when it increases the benefits of interbrand competition.0 4
Since vertical non-price restraints often stimulate interbrand
competition,0 5 it is not surprising that competing manufacturers object
to them."° The increased competition forces market participants to
work harder.0 7 Consequently, U.S. antitrust law does not condemn
vertical non-price restraints per se."°8 Rather, the courts undertake a
rule of reason analysis to weigh the procompetitive versus the
anticompetitive effects of the restraint." 9 However, before undertaking
this analysis, the courts require plaintiffs to satisfy a preliminary issue.
Unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the restrictions are imposed by
a manufacturer with market power,"I0 the courts will not proceed in
their analysis."' Accordingly, whether market power exists is a

L.J. 687, 688, 716 (1983) (arguing that a rule of reason should apply to limit vertical restraints
only when they reasonably appear likely to lead to horizontal collusion).
103. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 36 (citing Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 51-57 (1977)); id. ('Through single-brand distribution arrangements, manufacturers
are able to ensure that their products receive the maximum level of attention and product
promotion at all stages of distribution, because there are no competing products to distract the
distributor's attention."); see also Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 726 (citing Ryko Mfg. Co. v.
Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1234 n.17 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[A]n exclusive dealing clause
guarantees that the manufacturer's marketing investment will not be lost to other firms when the
distributor makes his sales presentation to potential buyers.... [This] encourages interbrand
competition.")); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-29 (1961).
104. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 13-14; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52.
105. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 13-14; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52.
106. Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 14.
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 735-36; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-57.
109. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
110. Market power is the power "to force a purchaser to do something that he would not
do in a competitive market." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984).
It also has been defined as "the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output."
Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
111. See Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 726; Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752, 761 (1984); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Fuji Brief,
supra note 31, at 14 (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 116 (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES]); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: MERGERS, CONTRACTING AND

STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 134. 160 (1987) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS]; David
Reiffen & Michael Vita, Comment, Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers, 63 ANTITRUST
L.J. 917, 921-22 (1995).
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threshold issue in evaluating the anticompetitiveness of non-price
vertical restraints."1 2
In determining the existence of market power, courts must first
define the relevant geographic market and the relevant product
market."' Without an accurate assessment of the relevant markets, it
is impossible to calculate the degree of power possessed by a market
participant." 4 Despite the importance of accurately defining the relevant
market, Kodak argued for market definitions in its section 301 petition
that directly contradict recent U.S. court decisions regarding Kodak's
geographic market for color film and its product market for the
processing of color paper." 5 Ironically, in those cases, Kodak argued
successfully for courts to adopt market definitions that were fundamentally inconsistent with the market definitions Kodak later advocated in
its section 301 petition." 6 Consequently, Kodak's argument that Fuji's
business practices are anticompetitive appears to have been disingenuous.
In its section 301 petition, Kodak argued that the relevant geographic
market for consumer photographic film was the nationwide Japanese
market." 7 However, at the same time, Kodak was successfully convincing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to adopt a different
definition of the relevant geographic market in order to be removed
from the restrictions of antitrust consent decrees in the United
States.' 8 Before the Second Circuit, Kodak argued that it lacked
market power for color film in the United States because the relevant
geographic market was worldwide." 9 The court adopted Kodak's
worldwide market definition and, as a result, it determined that Kodak
should be released from the consent decree because it lacked market
power.'O

112. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 14.
113. Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 15 (citing Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1979) ("It is, of course, a basic principle in the law of monopolization
that the first step in a court's analysis must be definition of the relevant markets.")).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 16-18. Compare Privatizing Protection, supra note 25, at 146-70, 241 with
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1995), ajig 853 F. Supp.
1454 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) [hereinafter Eastman Kodak]; see also Rewriting History, supra note 58,

at 269-74.
116. See Eastman Kodak, 63 F.3d at 104-05; see also Privatizing Protection, supra note 25,
at 146-70, 241; Rewriting History, supra note 58, at 269-74.
117. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 16 (citing Privatizing Protection, supra note 25, at
146-70, 241).
118. See Eastman Kodak, 63 F.3d at 104-07.
119. See id.
120. See id. In its rebuttal to Fuji's brief, Kodak maintains that its § 301 position is
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Kodak also argued in its section 301 petition that the relevant
product market for photofinishing was limited to wholesale
photofinishing.' However, in the antitrust consent decree proceedings,
Kodak convinced the court that the relevant product market for
photofinishing was not limited to wholesale photofinishing, but also
included minilabs'2 Even though Kodak dominated the wholesale
photofinishing business in the United States, the court released Kodak
from its consent decree.' The court was persuaded that Kodak lacked
market power because the growth in minilab locations prevented Kodak
from dominating the photofinishing market. 24
Kodak's alternative definitions of the relevant market is more than
an attempt to have it both ways. Without the restrictive definition of the
relevant market in its section 301 petition, Kodak's allegations are
without merit. With a worldwide market definition, Fuji would lack
market power in the color film market because its worldwide market
share is lower than Kodak's.2 5 Similarly, if the relevant product
market includes minilabs, as Kodak argued in the antitrust consent
decree proceedings, Fuji possesses no market power in photofinishing
in Japan just as Kodak possesses no market power in photofinishing in
the United States. 126 Without market power in either the color film or

consistent with traditional antitrust analysis. Memorandum Submitted in Response to Fuji's
Rewriting History, titled Japanese Market Barriers in Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
Vol. I, at 171-74 (Nov. 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Vol. I]. Essentially Kodak
contends that buyers in the U.S. market can turn to foreign suppliers, but that buyers in Japan
cannot turn to foreign suppliers because of Fuji's control of the distribution system. Id. at 172.
Therefore, the geographic market for Japanese buyers is Japan while the geographic market for
American buyers is the world. Id.
121. Privatizing Protection, supra note 25, at i, 33.
122. Eastman Kodak, 63 F.3d at 99.
123. Id. at 100, 109-10.
124. United States v. Eastman Kodak, 853 F. Supp. 1454, 1482 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)
("Although the photofinishing market today contains similar options to those available in
1954-mail-order finishing and finishing by macrolabs-it is now affected by the emergence
of a very significant alternative-the minilab."), ajffd, 63 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1995).
125. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 16. While Kodak and Fuji each enjoy approximately
70% market shares in their home countries, they each control roughly 35% of the market share
in countries excluding Japan and the United States. Kodak has a slight edge over Fuji in
worldwide market share. Rewriting History, supra note 58, at 155-56 (citing 1993-1994 Int'l
Photo Processing Indus. Report) (also citing Sixth Annual Robinson Report).
126. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 17; Eastman Kodak, 63 F.3d at 109 (finding that, due
to the proliferation of minilabs, Kodak possesses no market power in photofinishing in the
United States). Kodak has established itself as the world's largest photofinisher. Rewriting
History, supra note 58, at 94-95, ex.17 (citing 1993-1994 Int'l Photo Processing Indus. Report,
at 7-2) (also citing Sixth Annual Robinson Report). The market share for photofinishing is about
the same for both companies in their home markets: Kodak's share is 70% in the United States
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photofinishing market, Fuji's business practices could not be
exclusionary or anticompetitive." Therefore, if USTR accepts the
market definition that Kodak argued before U.S. courts, Kodak's
allegations would be summarily dismissed." s
2. Resale Price Maintenance
In its section 301 petition, Kodak also alleged that Fuji was engaged
in vertical minimum price-fixing through resale price maintenance
schemes that it had entered into with distributors and retailers.'29
Under U.S. antitrust law, vertical price-fixing is per se illegal."3
However, even in the case of per se violations, U.S. courts have
required private plaintiffs to prove that they have suffered an "antitrust
injury" in order to recover for an antitrust violation.'3 ' To satisfy the
antitrust injury requirement, a plaintiff must show that it is a member
of the class that the antitrust laws were intended to protect and that its
injury was caused by a decrease in competition that was directly
attributable to the defendant's anticompetitive conduct."
The antitrust injury requirement is especially important when a
competitor is complaining about a rival's pricing behavior because
competitors are more likely to complain when the market is highly
competitive. Accordingly, courts will not allow a competitor to complain
about a rival's pricing practices unless it can demonstrate that (1) the
rival's pricing was at below-cost predatory levels, 3 3 or (2) the rival's
pricing facilitated horizontal price fixing which excluded or foreclosed
the competitor from the relevant market.'34

while Fuji's share is 65% in Japan. Id. at 94-95 (citing 1993-1994 Int'l Photo ProcessingIndus.
Report, at 7-2).
127. Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 16; WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra
note 111, at 116; WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 111, at 134, 160; Reiffen
& Vita, supra note 111, at 921-22.
128. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 18-21 (arguing that according to principles of judicial
and collateral estoppel, Kodak's arguments for a favorable market definition in the § 301
proceedings are precluded to the extent those arguments are inconsistent with the market
definition it successfully advocated in the antitrust consent decree proceedings).
129. Privatizing Protection, supra note 25, at 243.
130. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911). The per
se illegality of vertical price-fixing has been weakened by subsequent cases and economic
scrutiny. See Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 735-36; Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761-62; Colgate, 250
U.S. at 307; see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 159-65 (2d ed. 1994).
131. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1990).
132. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977).
133. Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 339.
134. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 130, at 159-60.
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Regardless of whether Fuji is actually conspiring with its retailers
and distributors to fix prices, Kodak has failed to demonstrate that it has
suffered an antitrust injury because it has not demonstrated that Fuji's
pricing was either predatory or exclusionary.' 35 Kodak's original
petition attempted to establish the existence of price fixing by arguing
that prices of Fuji film are higher in Japan than in other countries and
are relatively stable.'36 Even if it were true that Fuji had illegally
conspired to inflate prices in Japan, the existence of higher prices would
not cause a decrease in competition that would harm Kodak. In fact, the
existence of high prices in Japan would "represent a competitive
opportunity for Kodak, not a market barrier. '37
Theoretically, Kodak could have established an antitrust injury by
arguing that Fuji's resale price maintenance (RPM) schemes were
exclusionary, but its original section 301 petition failed to make such an
argument.' 38 After Fuji pointed out this deficiency in Kodak's allegation, Kodak did attempt to explain how Fuji's RPM scheme was
exclusionary, but its explanation appeared to be inconsistent with
previous statements and with basic concepts of commercial practicability. For example, Kodak maintained that Fuji's RPM scheme was
exclusionary because it facilitated horizontal price collusion among
retailers. 39 In other words even if Kodak tried to sell below Fuji, the
retailers would not pass along the savings to the consumers because the
RPM scheme kept the price at artificially high levels.
Unfortunately for Kodak, the chance that thousands of retailers
would be able to agree to cooperate and not "cheat" on each other by
selling below the set price is highly unlikely."' In addition, Kodak's
revised argument is inconsistent with previous statements by Kodak
officials that the company did not intend to compete against Fuji on
price.' 4' Because the only group that could possibly have been harmed
by a decrease in competition caused by Fuji's alleged RPM scheme
would have been the Japanese consumers, Kodak itself has not suffered
an antitrust injury. Consequently, USTR should not have initiated an
investigation that could possibly lead to trade sanctions when Kodak's

135. Therefore, under U.S. antitrust law, Kodak would lack standing to complain about
resale price maintenance by its competitors. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 584 n.8 (1986).
136. Privatizing Protection, supra note 25, at 40, 51.
137. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 21-22.
138. See id. at 21.
139. Volume I, supra note 120, at 72-73.
140. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 130, at 160.
141. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 22; Rewriting History, supra note 58, at 186-88;
Kodak Intends to Establish Stronghold in Japan, JIJl PRESS TICKER SERV., Aug. 26, 1986.
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allegations fail to establish even a cognizable harm for which the U.S.
antitrust laws could possibly offer relief.'42
In summary, Kodak's petition suffers fundamental defects because
it has taken inconsistent positions regarding the definition of the relevant
market'4 3 and would actually benefit from Fuji's price maintenance
scheme.'" If Kodak had brought its allegation before a U.S. federal
court instead of USTR, then in all likelihood, its claims would have
been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.'45 However, because section 301 contains no standards of
proof or legal precedent, the statute permits the survival of petitions,
like Kodak's, that are fundamentally defective.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS

Besides its numerous procedural and substantive defects, the use of
section 301 to combat private restraints that occur outside the United
States will have repercussions on U.S. international trade relations. Just
as the international application of U.S. antitrust law raises concerns
regarding international comity,' the use of section 301 raises these
concerns more directly.'47 While extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law involves punishing a foreign national, retaliation or threats
to retaliate under section 301 involves placing direct blame on the
country itself.'4 8 Furthermore, because there is no multilateral or
bilateral agreement that provides binding standards for determining
whether conduct is anticompetitive,'4 9 the use of the anticompetitive
practice provision of section 301 to regulate foreign conduct arguably
allows the United States to impose its own standards of behavior on
other nations.'5 In addition, since no violation of international law or
U.S. legal right is required for USTR to take action under the
anticompetitive practice provision, any retaliation pursuant to section
301 may be an action outside the limits of international law.'5 '

142. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 22.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 117-24.
144. See supra text accompanying note 137.
145. See Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 22.
146. Smith, supra note 2, at 251-52.
147. Id. at 281.
148. Id.
149. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK ch. 4, at 126-36 (1991).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
151. See Robert Hudec, RetaliationAgainst "Unreasonable" ForeignTrade Practices:The
New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461, 521, 525-26
(1975); Marjorie Minkler, The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, Section 301: A Permissible
Enforcement Mechanism or a Violation of the United States' Obligations Under International
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Even if a WTO agreement on anticompetitive standards existed, any
trade sanctions imposed unilaterally under section 301 would be illegal.
Article 23 of the Uruguay Round Agreement's Dispute Settlement
Understanding prohibits member nations from making a "determination"
that another government violated the Agreement unless the WTO has
already reached the same conclusion. 5 Therefore, any unilateral
determination by USTR that another Uruguay Round-member country
violated any future WTO agreement regarding anticompetitive activity
without a parallel decision from the WTO would violate the Uruguay
Round. More importantly, the mere threat of unilateral retaliation under
section 301 violates the spirit of the Agreement even when the United
States does not actually retaliate.' 53
By punishing, or threatening to punish, a foreign country for conduct
that is not prohibited by international or bilateral agreements, the United
States also creates a risk that foreign countries will retaliate against
American companies by enacting provisions similar to section 301." s
Furthermore, by acting as a "benign" dictator, and laying down its own
definition of a fair trading regime, the United States, as an influential
world economic power, undermines respect for orderly procedures and
the rule of law in the economic relations between nations.'55 This
willingness to ignore GATT/WTO obligations may spread cynicism to
other countries, possibly leading them to ignore their own trade
commitments.'56 Finally, trade liberalization has traditionally required
reciprocal concessions to be politically feasible.'57 Therefore, section
301, in its current form, damages any prospects for reaching future
agreements with foreign countries regarding the regulation of

Law, 11 J.L. & COM. 283, 300-02 (1992). Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the extent and limit
of a state's laws or regulations. In determining whether a state has jurisdiction to prescribe
conduct that occurs outside its borders, courts usually require that the conduct have substantial
effects within the state's territory. United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (1945); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-403
(1987).
152. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112, 128-29 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
153. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE U.S.-JAPAN CAR DISPUTE: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF RECENT U.S. POLICY 15-16 (1995).
154. Alan Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in InternationalCommercial Relations:
The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 263 (1992); BHAGWATI, supra
note 149, at 52-53; Smith, supra note 2, at 289.
155. BHAGWATI, supra note 149, at 56.
156. See id.
157. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism:An Overview ch. 1, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM I (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
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anticompetitive activity because it demands that trading partners of the
United States take unilateral steps to eliminate private trade barriers
without demanding similar guarantees of enforcement from the United
States itself.5 '
As this Note went to publication, USTR announced that it would take
Kodak's case against Fuji and Japan to the WTO.' 9 Presumably, since
there is no WTO agreement regarding private anticompetitive conduct,
the United States will attempt to prove what is known as a "nonviolation, nullification and impairment" case."6 Article 26 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding allows a member nation to complain
about another member's action that does not expressly violate the
Agreement when the action "nullifies or impairs" benefits that would
have resulted from the Agreement but for the other member's action. 6 ' While the decision to go to the WTO suggests that the United
States might be willing to seek multilateral solutions to trade disputes,
instead of unilateral action under section 301, section 301 in its current
form could still permit the United States to retaliate against Japan if the
United States is not satisfied with the WTO's resolution of the
dispute. 62 In addition, because, in "non-violation" cases under the
Uruguay Round, the foreign government must only make a "mutually
satisfactory adjustment that ameliorates the nullification or impairment
it has caused," 63 the United States would not be able to force Japan
to modify its antitrust laws or to increase its enforcement activity.
Therefore, even though the WTO currently offers the United States a
remedy within the boundaries of international law, the problem of
private trade barriers in foreign countries still would persist. Accordingly, the United States should continue to work for solutions to the issues
raised by the Kodak case that do not suffer from the dangerous
procedural and substantive infirmities of Kodak's section 301 petition.

158. See id.; Fuji Brief, supra note 31, at 7.
159. Paul Blustein, U.S. Shelving Threat of Sanctions on Japan: Kodak Case to Be Taken
to WTO Instead, WASH. POST, June 12, 1996, at Fl.
160. See SAA, supra note 54, at 350.
161. Id.; see also Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 152, at 130.
162. SAA, supra note 54, at 349 (noting that when a USTR investigation does not involve
a Uruguay Round Agreement, the United States can ignore the dispute settlement procedures of
Article 23 of the Uruguay Round).
163. Id. at 350.
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STEPS FOR THE FUTURE

Given section 301's numerous procedural' 64 and substantive'6 5
defects and its detrimental effect on international trade relations,"6 the
United States should not attempt to combat private anticompetitive
behavior that occurs abroad through the enforcement of section 301 in
its current state. However, the elimination of private trade barriers in
foreign countries should continue to be one of the United States's
primary goals in further trade negotiations. Despite section 301's
defects'6 7 and the limitations that exist in attempting to apply U.S.
antitrust law extraterritorially, 68 there are steps that can be taken to
address the problem of foreign private trade barriers.
First, the United States can attempt to strengthen the ability of the
antitrust enforcement agencies of different countries to exchange
information.1 69 These bilateral or multilateral agreements must provide
for reciprocal access to nonpublic, confidential information and should
allow antitrust offices to use their compulsory powers of evidence
gathering on one another's behalf.7 ° A new U.S. law, the International
Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1994 (the Act), represents an important
first step in the direction of better cooperation.' The Act allows the
DOJ's Antitrust Division to enter into international cooperation
agreements with its sister agencies.' 72 Other countries
should be urged
3
to pass similar legislation to speed up the process.11
Second, the United States should pursue multilateral or bilateral
agreements aimed at promulgating principles or rules regarding
competition policy and establishing the GATT/WTO framework as the
proper forum.'74 The agreements should focus on establishing shared
principles of substantive law that allow for impartial dispute resolution
in the event that a conflict arises over a nation's enforcement of its own
164. See supra pt. III.
165. See supra pt. IV.
166. See supra pt. V.
167. See supra pts. III, IV.
168. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
169. See Hachigian, supra note 8, at 146; Fox, supra note 16, at pts. V.B.-C.
170. See Hachigian, supra note 8, at 146; Fox, supra note 16, at pts. V.B.-C.
171. Hachigian, supra note 8, at 119; The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438, 108 Stat. 4597, 4597 (1994) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 46, 57b-1, 1311-1312, 6201-6212).
172. The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-438,
108 Stat. 4597, 4597 (1994) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 57b-1, 1311-1312, 16011612); see Jeremy Kahn, U.S. Acts to Boost Antitrust Efforts, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 1994, at 5.
173. See Hachigian, supra note 8, at 119.
174. See Gary N. Horlick & Michael A. Meyer, The International Convergence of
Competition Policy, 29 INT'L LAW. 65, 74-75 (1995); Fox, supra note 16, at pt. V.A.
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' In July 1993, the International Antitrust Code Working Group
laws. "75
released a draft international antitrust code, which is proposed as a
WTO agreement. 76 In the absence of an agreement with substantive
rules, the United States should seek to negotiate a multilateral agreement
that establishes a procedural framework for "positive comity."'" This
framework would require all nations to investigate allegations of private
anticompetitive behavior when requested to do so by another signatory
country.
While it may take time for the international community to reach a
consensus on either a set of substantive rules or a positive comity
procedural framework, the United States should pursue a WTO
agreement on competition policy as one of its foremost trade policy
objectives.' Bringing an agreement within the WTO framework offers
several policy advantages. First, it will make it easier for U.S. private
parties to pursue legitimate claims within the WTO for foreign
anticompetitive practices.' 79 Second, it will establish the United
States's commitment to a world trading system based on the rule of law
and legalize any claims brought by the United States.' Without a
competition agreement, countries will continue to view actions brought
under section 301, and actions based on the extraterritorial 18application
of U.S. antitrust law, as clear breaches of international law. 1
Third, the United States should harmonize its international trade laws
with its antitrust laws.' U.S. antidumping laws present the most
glaring need for synthesis with other U.S. antitrust laws.'83 Unlike
175. See Fox, supra note 16, at pt. V.B.
176. See Draft International Antitrust Code, supra note 5, at S-3 to S-22; Horlick & Meyer,
supra note 174, at 75; InternationalAntitrust Code Will Be Studied by GATT Members, 65
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), Aug., 19, 1993, at S-3.
177. See Srith, supra note 2, at 243.
178. See Horlick & Meyer, supra note 174, at 75.
179. Section 301 petitioners would no longer need to fear that USTR might reject their
complaints out of a fear of violating international law. See supra text accompanying notes 15153. In addition, a dispute resolution procedure administered under the auspices of the
GATr/WTO would avoid the jurisdictional problems associated with private antitrust actions.
See supra pt. I.
180. See supra text accompanying note 155.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53; Minkler, supra note 151, at 300-02.
182. See Thomas Schoenbaum, The InternationalTrade Laws and the New Protectionism:
The Need For a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393, 422-24, 436
(1994); see Fox, supra note 16, at pt. IV.B.5.-6.; Horlick & Meyer, supra note 174, at 72-73.
183. See Schoenbaum, supra note 182, at 398. Dumping occurs when a firm sells its
product below fair value in an export market for the purpose of eliminating its competitors in
that market. Id. at 396; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988); Christopher M. Barbuto, Toward
Convergence'ofAntitrustand Trade Law: An InternationalTrade Analogue to Robinson-Patman,
62 FORD. L. REV. 2047, 2066-71 (1994).
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domestic antitrust laws, which generally increase competition and lower
prices, national antidumping rules often reduce competition and raise
prices. 8 4 Instead of preventing anticompetitive practices, antidumping
laws often protect domestic industries from foreign competition. s5 As
a result, dumping laws have penalized behavior by foreign companies
when precisely the same behavior by domestic companies is
nonactionable. 86
'
Another area in need of harmonization is the U.S. antitrust exemption
for certified export associations.'8 7 While the export cartels immune
from U.S. law still may be liable under a foreign country's competition
law, "88
' the effect of the exemption is to encourage their use by our
trading partners.8 9 It would be hypocritical for U.S. enforcement
agencies to pursue actions against foreign-based cartels when the United
States encourages their use domestically." 9
Harmonization also could be used as a carrot to entice other
countries into entering into a multilateral agreement on competition
rules. Even countries that have not traditionally regulated
anticompetitive conduct may be willing to enter into agreements on
substantive competition rules if they were convinced that the United
States and other countries with restrictive antidumping laws were willing
to judge both foreign and domestic pricing behavior by the same set of
rules. In fact, the establishment of uniform price-predation rules could
be part of any GATT competition agreement.''
Finally, Congress should amend section 301 itself. Specifically,
section 301 should be limited to permit action only where another nation
acts in violation of a multilateral trade agreement such as the
GATT/WTO, or any other competition law agreement reached in the

184. See Horlick & Meyer, supra note 174, at 72-73; Schoenbaum, supra note 182, at 402;
see also ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, Feb. 1994, at 239. The domestic price
discrimination statute, the Robinson-Patman Act, contains a different test than the antidumping
law for determining whether different prices are being charged for the same goods. 15 U.S.C.
§ 13a (1988); Patrick Chisholm, Chalk Up One for Protectionists,WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1995,
at A10.
185. See Horlick & Meyer, supra note 174, at 72-73; Schoenbaum, supra note 182, at 402;
see also ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, Feb. 1994, at 239.
186. Horlick & Meyer, supra note 174, at 72-74.
187. Schoenbaum, supra note 182, at 418. Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act and the Export Trading Company Act, an export association can obtain a certificate which
insulates the association from liability under the antitrust laws. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 6A,
4001-4021 (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 325.2 (1992)).
188. Id. at 419.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Fox, supra note 16, at pt. V.A.5.
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future. In addition, when a private party in the United States complains
about foreign toleration of anticompetitive business practices, the DOJ
not USTR, should be given the responsibility for examining the
petitioner's allegations; it is better equipped, as the enforcer of domestic
competition law, than USTR to analyze such conduct."9 Furthermore,
assuming a multilateral agreement can be reached regarding substantive
competition rules, a revised section 301 should, at a minimum, require
petitioners to (1) exhaust local remedies 93 and (2) demonstrate that the
anticompetitive conduct violates the agreed upon international norms.
Where there is a gap in international norms and U.S. law, .a revised
section 301 should force petitioners to demonstrate that the conduct
complained of violates both U.S. antitrust law and the corresponding
body of law in the foreign country. 94
VII. CONCLUSION
Although United States policymakers should be concerned about
reducing private trade barriers that restrict competition in international
trade, section 301, in its current state, is not an adequate mechanism for
pursuing these goals. Besides violating United States commitments to
the Uruguay Round195 and the dispute resolution procedures of the
WTO, 196 the attempt to combat foreign private trade barriers through
section 301 might lead to disastrous results. Not only is the
decisionmaking process under section 301 full of serious procedural and
substantive defects,'97 section 301 exposes the United States to the risk
of unintentionally provoking other countries into adopting retaliatory
provisions that would damage U.S. export interests far more than any
foreign private restraints that currently exist.' 98 The experience of the
United States with its well-intentioned antidumping laws is unfortunate
evidence that such an occurrence is highly probable. Originally, U.S.
antidumping laws were created to protect American industry from
"'unfair" foreign competition. Today, other nations have instituted their
own antidumping laws in order to protect their domestic industries from
American competition. 99
192. See John 0. Haley, Competition and Trade Policy: Antitrust Enforcement: Do
Differences Matter?, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 303, pt. IV. (1995).
193. See supra pt. III.B.
194. See supra pt. IV.A.
195. See supra pt. V.

196. Id.
197. See supra pts. III, IV.
198. See supra pt. IV.
199. Smith, supra note 2, at 289 n.179 (citing JOHN H.

JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING

SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
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While multilateral negotiations are often slow and fraught with
fiendish complexity, they offer the world trading system the best hope
for developing rules of conduct for all nations. Therefore, if United
States policymakers are serious about reducing private trade barriers,
they will push for the adoption of an international competition code such
as the one proposed by the International Antitrust Working Group.2"
By incorporating this agreement into the dispute settlement process of
the WTO, the United States will provide its domestic companies with
the best opportunity to pursue legitimate causes of action. But, more
importantly, it will protect them from statutes similar to section 301
enacted by foreign countries.2"' Hopefully, policymakers will realize
that the unilateral pursuit of U.S. international trade policy, through the
use of section 301 exemplified by Kodak's petition to USTR, only
diminishes the significant gains that have been achieved so far through
international cooperation.

200. See supra note 5.
201. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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